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Trust in world politics: converting ‘identity’ into
a source of security through trust-learning1
ALI BILGIC*
In the discipline of international relations, the concept of trust has been
theorised in two ways: the ‘rationalist’ approach and the ‘normative’
approach. This article aims to show that these approaches do not adequately
reflect how trust operates in world politics and that trust provides a new way
of understanding the identity–security nexus in international relations. It is
argued that as actors learn to trust each other, this trust-learning process has
a transformative effect on their definition of self-interests and identities. The
elaborated understanding of trust in the security dilemma is operationalised
in terms of the immigration security dilemma.
Keywords: identity; immigration; security; security dilemma; trust
In the discipline of international relations (IR), the concept of trust has been an
undertheorised concept. A number of works on trust in IR have created an
uneasy compromise between the idea of trust and the rational actor model.
These approaches understand trust as an instrument to further self-interests.
Contrary to this ‘rationalist’ approach, it has recently been argued that trust is
necessary to transcend the security dilemma between individuals and social
groups by building a common identity between them (Booth and Wheeler
2008). This conceptual article aims to show that these approaches do not
adequately reflect how trust operates in world politics and that trust provides a
new way of understanding the identity–security nexus in IR. It will be argued
that as actors learn to trust each other, this trust-learning process has a
transformative effect on actors’ definition of their self-interests and identities.
The discussion will be pursued in three sections. In the first section, the
conventional approaches to the identity–security nexus in the areas of the
security dilemma and migration will be discussed. Their primordialist and
apolitical understanding of identity will be problematised. Following this
problematisation, the security dilemma framework of Booth and Wheeler
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(2008) will be contrasted to the conventional approaches by highlighting how
differently they conceptualise the identity–security nexus through the introduc-
tion of trust. However, the problems in Booth and Wheeler’s framework,
especially in relation to the conceptualisation of trust in world politics, will also
be examined. In the second section, the concept of trust will be explored. This
section primarily focuses on the question of what trust means in world politics,
how it works and its effects by introducing a new theoretical foundation to
study and understand trust in world politics. This theoretical foundation will be
built through the combination of Alexander Wendt’s (1999) social construct-
ivism and Bill McSweeney’s (1999) sociological approach to the formation of
collective identities. In the last section, the elaborated understanding of trust in
the security dilemma will be operationalised in terms of the immigration security
dilemma.
Conventional understanding of the identity–security nexus: identity as a source
of insecurity
The identity–security nexus in the areas of the security dilemma and migration
The concept of ‘identity’ was (re)introduced in the discipline of IR in general,
and security studies in particular, by social constructivist approaches (Lapid and
Kratochwil 1996; Wendt 1999) and is used by scholars belonging to different
approaches (Adler and Barnett 1998; Campbell 1994; Hoogensen and Rottem
2004). The analytical focus will be on two areas in parallel with the objectives
of the article: identity conceptualisations in the security dilemma literature and
in the area of the security dimension of migration.
In the security dilemma literature, the concept of identity was first introduced
by Barry Posen’s (1993) work about security dilemmas at the societal level. In
Posen’s analysis, the political elites of societies manipulate the historical enmities
between ethno-religious groups, which leads to increasing fear and insecurity for
both. This motivates an ethnic group to pursue its self-security interests.
However, this attempt results in more insecurity for the other group, which,
as a response, tries to increase its own security by ethnocentric security policies.
The pursuit of self-security on the part of each ethnic group eventually evolves
into a vicious cycle of security competition. A similar perspective is also adopted
by Stuart Kaufman (1996), with a more analytical and detailed focus on how
the political elite manipulates the already existing fears and enmities. However,
the most important work in the security dilemma literature to link security and
identity is that of Paul Roe (2005). According to Roe, ethno-religious groups
have different ‘societal identities’, which are ‘securitised’ by policy makers.
Attempts to increase security lead to more insecurity and, eventually, ethnic
conflict.
The securitisation approach used by Roe has appealed to wider scholarship in
the area of migration. The securitisation approach is an attempt to understand
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how an issue is presented by ‘securitising’ actors—mainly decision makers at the
state level—as an ‘existential threat’ to the societal identities of receiving
communities (Waever 1993). According to this approach, ‘securitising’ political
actors argue that the social (read national) identities of the receiving commu-
nities are challenged by immigrants, who supposedly have a ‘different’ identity
(Balzacq 2008; Balzacq and Carrera 2006; Boswell 2007; Huysmans 2000;
Waever 1993). A securitisation analysis, as the approach’s prominent figures
state, ‘stabilises’ the identities of the receiving community and the immigrant
community in order to conduct a security analysis (Buzan and Waever 1997,
243). Without such stabilisation, there would be no unit which could be studied
as the referent of security.
These two approaches (the societal security dilemma and the securitisation of
migration) share a particular understanding of identity as a ‘thing’, as expressed
by McSweeney (1999, 73). The security dilemma and securitisation approaches
rely heavily on the idea that societal identity has essential characteristics and,
when formed, it ‘freezes’. As a result, different and conflictive identities, with
their essentialist features, are treated as the sources of insecurity. What is
missing in these approaches is the role of political interests in the construction
and reconstruction of social identities; or, to put it differently, the fluidity of
collective identities because of the political contestation over them. This results
in treating identity as ‘exogenous to political processes’, without discovering the
role of politics in the (re)construction of particular social identities and the
marginalisation of others (Bilgin 2010, 83–84). The implication of this
ahistorical and apolitical understanding is that identities are generally under-
stood in a primordialist and essentalist sense, which leads to the conceptualisa-
tion of identity as a source of insecurity for social groups which have ‘different’
identities (ibid.). However, identity can also be studied as a source of security, if
it is understood from the political perspective. The security dilemma framework
of Booth and Wheeler (2008) offers a new way of approaching identity (and
enables a political analysis) as a source of security by attempting to explore the
role of trust in identity-construction processes.
The new security dilemma framework
The security dilemma is conventionally understood as a situation in which,
when an actor tries to improve security for itself, it creates more insecurity all
round.2 Challenging this understanding, for Booth and Wheeler (2008), this
approach confuses ‘the security dilemma’ with ‘the security paradox’, which
refers to ‘a situation in which two or more actors, seeking only to improve their
own security, provoke through their words or actions an increase in mutual
tension, resulting in less security all around’ (9; original emphasis). According to
their new thinking, the heart of the security dilemma is lemma—a Greek word
for ‘proposition’—as a ‘dilemma’ is a situation in which an actor is forced to
make a decision between ‘two equally balanced alternatives’ (6). The security
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dilemma is a strategic predicament of an actor about how to interpret others’
intentions and capabilities, and how to respond to them (3–4). Booth and
Wheeler conceptualise three types of ideational settings from which the choices
of actors can be derived: the logics of insecurity.
One choice of political actors can be underlined by fatalism. Fatalism foresees
that when an actor faces insecurity in relation to another under the condition of
uncertainty, it should prepare itself for the worst by adopting policies whose
objective is to increase security ostensibly just for the actor itself. Fear plays a
key role in the formation of fatalist logic (62). Another choice is derived from
mitigator logic. Mitigator logic argues that insecurity can be ameliorated if
actors choose to cooperate in order to break the vicious cycle of security
competition and war. This depends on the ability of actors—mainly at the state
level—to develop shared norms and values. They ameliorate insecurity because
the common norms reduce the degree of uncertainty by providing some level of
predictability about others’ intentions (15–16). The third choice of political
actors is shaped by transcender logic. According to this logic, security dilemmas
can be transcended if a new type of relationship between social groups is
constructed through trust-building. Trust can be a choice for actors which are
ready to take risks to build security for themselves and others (16–17).
Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma conceptualisation provides important
advantages for students of security studies. The societal security dilemma
approaches reduce the security dilemma to action–reaction dynamics. In contrast,
Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma approach enables analyses which examine
political actors’ ideas about security and how their ideas affect their policy choices.
As it brings ‘choice’ to the centre of the security dilemma, it provides a new
framework for analysing actors’ responsibility in the escalation of crises into
conflicts. Unlike the securitisation approach, it enables one to discover the plurality
of the politics of security by focusing on alternative ideas and policies of security in
a political structure.
This innovative thinking has implications for the study of the identity–security
nexus. In the politics of security, different political actors have different ideas
about how to make a social group more secure in relation to another. The
choices of some aim to pursue security through ethnocentric (fatalist) security
policies, regardless of others’ security needs. However, there can be other
choices available to political actors which seek security for a social group with
others. If political actors choose to act in this way (the transcender logic), a
common identity between two groups which feel insecurity towards each other
can be constructed.
Booth and Wheeler’s most crucial contribution for the purposes of this
discussion is that the new security dilemma framework introduces trust into the
identity–security nexus. They define trust as a situation where ‘actors mutually
attempt to promote each others’ interests and values, including in circumstances
that cannot be observed’ (230). In order to transcend security dilemmas, trust
should be embedded in societal relations. In an embedded model, trust is so
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internalised in social relationships that it is not possible to talk about separate
identities: two ‘I’s become one ‘we’ (233). Therefore, a conceptual link between
the idea of trust and identity is made.
As important and innovative as their work may be, Booth and Wheeler’s trust
conceptualisation within the security dilemma framework also has problems. First,
although they include ‘interest’ in their definition of trust, they do not adequately
analyse the interest dimension of trust-building in world politics. Questions such as
what ‘interest’ means in trust relationships and how it differs from that in relations
characterised by mistrust remain unanswered. Among them, the vital question is:
What kinds of effects does the trust relationship produce for the interests of an
actor? The current analysis aims to build a stronger theoretical foundation for the
role of interests in trust-building processes.
Second, and related to the first problem, Booth and Wheeler focus extensively
on the ‘normative’ dimension of trust. They define the properties of trust as
taking a leap in the dark, empathy, vulnerability and integrity (234–245). For
them, when actors trust each other, they take a leap in the dark by relying on the
integrity of others, and expect them not to harm their interests. This
understanding is heavily influenced by Martin Hollis’s (1998) conceptualisation
of trust, which is not satisfactory for studying trust-building processes under the
conditions of insecurity in world politics. Why should an actor just take a leap
in the dark and make itself vulnerable, or try to empathise with others towards
whom it feels anxiety, fear and even enmity? In this discussion, it will be argued
that trust does not just appear out of normative considerations. Rather, actors
learn to trust each other through interaction taken by small steps, and self-
interest is a key motivation in trust-building.
The third problem is that Booth and Wheeler do not sufficiently elaborate
how a trust relationship between two actors leads to the construction of a
common identity between them. In fact, Booth and Wheeler’s study challenges
the dominant perspective about identity in IR, which attempts to ‘freeze’ it for
analytical purposes. Their framework enables an analysis of the role of trust in
identity politics, albeit that it remains undertheorised. In order to explore this
important relationship, the interest dimension of trust should be analysed
further. This study aims to accomplish this by using a combination of Wendtian
(1999) social constructivism and the sociological approach to identity developed
by McSweeney (1999). The parameters of the immigration security dilemma will
be built on this combination.
Trust in world politics: from ‘trust is in my interest’ to ‘trust is my interest’
The idea of trust
The concept of trust has been studied by scholars from different disciplines of
the social sciences. In spite of their differences in understanding the concept, all
approaches point to the idea that trust is a risky venture (Luhmann 1988, 97).
40 Ali Bilgic
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:0
9 0
9 J
un
e 2
01
5 
In spite of its risky character, trust has generally been considered as a valuable
asset in social relations mainly because, as Luhmann (1979, 1) put it, trust
makes the common life possible. Without trust, individuals would act solely on
the basis of rationalist cost–benefit analysis. This results in the limitation of
choices for individuals to actions which serve only their self-interests, regardless
of others’ needs or at the expense of others’ interests. In a social system
constituted and inhabited by the self-centric units assumed by the rational actor
model, a collective life can become almost impossible. As a result, ‘a [social]
system may lose its size; it may even shrink below a critical threshold necessary
for its own reproduction at a certain level of development’ (Luhmann 1988, 104).
For Luhmann, trust is necessary not only for building a common life, but
also for enriching it. Hollis (1998, 4) concurs: ‘we cannot flourish without
trust’.
As useful and necessary as it may be for the creation of the conditions of a
collective life, individuals can be discouraged from embarking on such a venture
because, by developing a relationship based on trust, the parties of trust become
more vulnerable. The exploitation of trust can harm a trusting party’s interests.
Is trust not then ‘irrational’? Why would an individual make him/herself more
vulnerable by placing his/her interests in the custody of others? In order to
answer these questions, the interest dimension of trust should be discussed.
According to the approach that prioritises the role of interest promotion as a
motive for trust-building, which is commonly highlighted in the trust literature,
trust characterises a social relationship which serves the interests of both the
trusting and trustee parties (Kohn 2008; Misztal 1996). The interest-based
definition of trust claims that two parties, whose interests might be different, can
develop trust towards each other if each party adopts the other’s interests as its
own (Dees 2004; Hardin 2002). Similarly, for Kohn (2008, 9), ‘trust is an
expectation, or disposition to expect, that another party will act in one’s
interests’. The result of a successful trust relationship is rewarding. By building
trust, as Misztal (1996, 22) nicely put it, ‘human beings, as emotional, rational
and instrumentally oriented agents, [seek] to ensure that their social relations
and arrangements meet their emotional, cognitive and instrumental needs’.
The approach focusing on the interest dimension of trust is challenged by
another approach, which prioritises the ‘normative’ side of trust-building
processes (Hollis 1998). This approach argues that if a trust relationship is
built to further participants’ self-interests, the relationship becomes fragile
because it can be broken when it does not serve the self-interests of the parties.
In contrast, according to Hollis (1998, 10–13), trust has a normative dimension,
whose source lies in ‘social norms and moral qualities’. These norms and moral
qualities construct a ‘bond’ between individuals. Trust therefore becomes an
expectation that others will honour this bond and ‘do what is right’.
Hollis’s criticism of the approaches which highlight the interest dimension of
trust is important for the purposes of this article. This is mainly because many
IR scholars have so far treated trust in the way that Hollis criticises—that is,
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merely as an instrument to serve self-interests (see below). However, Hollis and
the IR scholars he plausibly criticises do not sufficiently conceive the
transformative effect of trust relationships on the definition of the self-interests
and identities of the trust parties.
The interest dimension of trust deserves attention, especially when the concept
is studied in relation to the politics where diverse interests compete to affect
‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell 1935). In the conditions where a lack
of trust characterises political relations, individuals pursue their self-interests as
opposed to others’ interests. This potentially conflictive competition can pave
the way for a political structure in which each ‘self’ should take care of him/
herself. On the other hand, when political relations are based on trust, the
individual adopts others’ interests as the ‘self’s own interests, with the
expectation that others will act similarly. This does not mean the disappearance
of self-interest, rather the generation of the following idea: ‘I pursue my self-
interests better if I pursue the other’s interests because I trust that the other will
pursue my interests too’.
If neither party betrays the trust of the other, the trust relationship itself
eventually becomes the shared interest of both sides—something that both
value. In other words, they do not trust each other because the trust relationship
serves to further their self-interests, but because the trust relationship itself
becomes their self-interest. Their self-interests are redefined through trust-
building, or through adopting each other’s interests. If the trust relationship is
successful, they do not think that ‘trust is in my interest’, but that ‘trust is my
interest’. This idea has implications for studying and understanding the identity–
security nexus in world politics. In the following section, these implications will
be discussed.
The identity–security nexus with trust
It has previously been argued that in a social system without trust, individuals
act in accordance with their self-interests regardless of others’ interests. The
individual thinks that when others’ self-interests necessitate it, they will exploit
the trust s/he has put in them by jeopardising his/her interests. This problem is
effectively described by the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). In the PD game, the self
(-interest) is prioritised over the other (interest). In this well-known game,
motivated by self-interest, both prisoners choose to confess and, therefore, can
only achieve their third-degree preference (both are sentenced). One of the basic
assumptions of the game is that, as there is no assuring mechanism between the
prisoners to enforce an agreement on not to confess, each party’s self-interest
shapes their preferences. A lack of trust (accompanied by the lack of an
enforcing mechanism) between the prisoners results in one of the least-preferred
outcomes.
Some scholars in IR have attempted to solve the problem exemplified by the
PD by bringing trust into the game. However, this type of conceptualisation
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leads to Hollis’s (1998) question: When the cooperation does not serve parties’
self-interests, will trust just disappear? According to the rationalist approach to
trust, the answer is yes. Similarly to Hollis, Booth and Wheeler (2008, 155)
criticise the rationalist approach by arguing that this approach overlooks the
‘human factor’—that is, the personal attachments and feelings between the
parties.
The ‘human factor’ or normative side of trust is an important dimension of
trust-building processes. Personal attachments and compassion between actors
can alleviate the process by encouraging actors to understand the ideas and
feelings of others. However, they are not sufficient to generate trust-building in
world politics, where actors are to trust those who they do not know personally,
at best, or those with whom they share a history of enmity, fear and insecurity,
at worst. Can interpersonal emotions be adequate to enable trust at the societal
level, say, between ethnic groups which palpably feel fear towards each other?
For example, was it possible to build trust between Croats and Serbs in 1992 in
the former Yugoslavia? If yes, why could trust not emerge between them? In
order to generate trust in relation to the identity–security nexus in world
politics, the interest dimension of trust needs to be revisited, albeit in a different
way to how it is treated in the IR literature on trust.
A major separation was previously made between ‘trust is in my interest’ and
‘trust is my interest’. The former dominates the trust conceptualisations in IR
literature. Actors motivated by their self-interests choose to ‘trust’ another
because they believe that their cooperation serves to further their self-interests.
Their broad objective is to address the problem manifested in the PD game—
that is, what types of changes trust can make in the PD game and in world
politics (Brennan 1997; Deutch 1958; Wallace and Rothaus 1969). Kydd
(2005, 6) defines trust as ‘a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation
to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side
prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it’. In Kydd’s conceptualisa-
tion, trust is a ‘rational’ choice made by ‘rational’ actors. In this way, trust
becomes a property of the rational actor model.
The common pitfall in this approach is that the transformative role of a trust
relationship on actors’ interests and identities is never explored. However, a
trust relationship can change actors’ identities and interests. Wendtian social
constructivism can explain why. According to Wendt (1999, 139–146),
‘identity’ and ‘interest’ are the two main properties of actors. The properties
of actors constitute the behaviours of them. Behaviours shape an actor’s
interaction with others. Their interaction constructs what Wendt calls ‘struc-
tures’, which in turn constitute an actor’s properties. In other words, there is a
mutually constitutive relationship between an actor’s properties and behaviours.
The Wendtian approach provides a fresh perspective to understanding the role
of trust in world politics.
According to Wendt (1999, 18), the idea of ‘self-interest’ changes in different
structures. The conception of self-interest in a structure underlined by the idea
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of ‘trust is in my interest’ is different from that in a structure of ‘trust is my
interest’. In the former, actors are motivated by the ‘self-interest’ defined by the
rational actor model. Trust has an instrumental value to further their interests.
An actor makes itself vulnerable by opening its self-interests to the exploitation
of others and, at the same time, it prevents itself from exploiting others’ trust.
For the dominant approach in IR literature, this is the end of the story.
However, for the current discussion, it is the beginning. If the Wendtian
approach is adopted, their trust relationship produces implications for their
interests. Insofar as the trust relationship is successful (no party betrays the trust
of another), they begin to construct a new structure that is different from the
one of ‘trust is in my interest’ through interacting, whereby learning is the key.
In their interaction, actors learn to trust each other. By not harming others’
interests with the expectation that others will not harm its interests, the actor
learns that the promotion of self-interests is not necessarily a conflictive process
which is pursued in opposition to others’ interests. As the actor adopts and
protects others’ interests as its own, it learns that others return its trust by
protecting its interests. In fact, the actor learns that the other is trustworthy. If
the trust relationship continues, actors learn more about each other’s interests,
ideas, needs and fears, and realise that they can pursue their self-interests better
when they do not seek to harm each other’s interests. Their interaction based on
trust constructs a new structure—a structure underlined by the idea of ‘trust is
my interest’. Following Wendt, in this structure, the definition of self-interest is
different from that assumed by the rational actor model. Through trust, self-
interest is reconstructed in a more conciliatory way.
A new trust structure and a new ‘self-interest’ have implications for the
identity conceptualisations discussed above. As a reminder, the two approaches
to identity discussed previously ‘stabilise’ social identity. In contrast, McSwee-
ney’s approach to identity highlights the political contestation over collective
identities. McSweeney (1999, 73) argues that identity is not ‘a thing’, but ‘a
process of negotiation among people and interest groups’. Different units in a
political structure claim and endeavour to construct alternative identities for the
collectivity. These alternative identities reflect the interests of political groups.
As a result, societal identity is subject to constant contestation, and is therefore
unsolidified and non-reified. In addition, it is political. McSweeney’s under-
standing of identity explores the interest dimension in identity-construction
processes. Hence, unlike the approaches discussed above, collective identity is
not conceptualised by appealing to essentialist ideas (ethnicity, religion,
institutional affiliation, such as common citizenship, and so on), but by
analysing the interests of political actors which have alternative ideas about
how the collective identity should be. If trust is about how to pursue interests, it
will have implications for the character of the collective identity.
Social groups can perceive insecurity in relation to each other. Political actors
are expected to choose policies, from among many, to address this insecurity,
which puts them in a security dilemma. From McSweeney’s perspective, if some
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groups of migrants or other societal groups are considered as ‘threats’ to the
self–collective identity, this is mainly because of the dominant political actors.
These political actors (at the state and non-state levels) define the interests of the
collectivity as opposed to, and at the expense of, other social groups’ interests.
They claim that the self-interests of the collectivity can be pursued better
without developing trust with others. Their conception of interests constitutes a
collective identity, which (re)constructs other social groups as ‘threats’ and as
untrustworthy. The properties of the collectivity constitute the behaviours of the
social group and shape its interactions with others. The interactions construct a
structure characterised by fear, enmity and mistrust, which in turn constitute the
properties.
In contrast, if political actors conceive that the interests of the collectivity can
be pursued better if they are able to build a trust relationship with others, a
different structure can be constructed. These political actors adopt other social
groups’ interests as their own because they think that they can promote their
self-interests in a more efficient way—that is, their choices are not restricted to
those that dichotomise others. They think that ‘trust is in my interest’. This is
similar to what Kydd (2005, 6) calls ‘cooperation’. However, what he does not
consider is the mutually constituted relationship between behaviours and actors’
properties.
If the trust relationship is successful, social groups learn to trust each other.
They learn that the other social group’s interests can coexist with the self’s
interests and that others are trustworthy. This trust-learning process through
interaction constructs a new political structure, which in turn transforms the
properties of the social group. The self-interest of the social group is
reconstructed in such a way that it includes others’ interests. In this new
political structure, social groups think that ‘trust is my interest’. Through trust-
learning, the security interests of the social groups become more and more
conflated. Social groups learn that they are not ‘essentially’ different from
others, but that their differences, which put their self-interests in opposition, are
politically constructed. This learning process results in the realisation of the idea
that a common ‘we’ feeling can be formed between social groups. As a result,
the security dilemma is transcended.
How would a trust-learning relationship work in practice? The primary
condition of trust-learning is that political actors (politicians, decision makers,
publicly respected figures or civil society actors) should act as ‘identity
entrepreneurs’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the trust-learning process, they
claim that the insecurity problem of the unit (the self-interest of the society or
the state, depending on the level of analysis) can be dealt with through building
a common identity with others. For example, in the case of Croat–Serb relations
in the former Yugoslavia, political actors such as the Civic Alliance of Serbia
argued for a Yugoslav Commonwealth, in which a certain level of Yugoslav
common identity would hold different ethnic groups together (Thomas 1999,
109–117). Other identity entrepreneurs would be the civil society actors in
Trust in world politics 45
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:0
9 0
9 J
un
e 2
01
5 
Serbia and Croatia which tried to promote trust between ethnic groups (Devic
1997, 190–197). Even during the civil war, women’s organisations in Serbia, in
particular, were active in this area (Bieber 2003; Hughes, Mladjenovic, and
Mrsevic 1995).
However, the trust-building activities of state and non-state actors at the
microstructure level failed in the former Yugoslavia, where the political
macrostructure was heavily dominated by ethno-nationalist groups. Their logic
of fatalism marginalised the alternative approach of trust-building by feeding
into the insecurity and fear of societies in a condition of uncertainty. The
Yugoslav case leads to the point that, as expressed by Booth and Wheeler
(2008, 245), trust is ‘elusive’ in world politics, but this does not rule out the
possibility of trust-learning as a way to achieve security through common
identity-building.
Towards the immigration security dilemma
In this last section, an example of this new security dilemma framework will be
illustrated with regard to one of the contemporary issues in the politics of
security: immigration. Before this discussion, a caveat is in order. Migration is a
multifaceted phenomenon. Different migrant groups can become different types
of insecurity for the receiving societies. For example, in some societies, an
immigrant community of a particular ethnic group can be a reason for
insecurity; in others, asylum-seekers from a neighbouring country can be
considered a destabilising factor. Irregular migration has various dimensions,
which generates insecurity for societies and states whose border regulations are
violated. In consideration of this complexity, the following discussion only
presents a sketch of the immigration security dilemma by drawing its broad
analytical boundaries. Students of security studies can adjust the framework in
relation to specific receiving societies and immigrant groups.
The ‘immigration security dilemma’ was first conceptualised by Mikhail
Alekseev. According to Alekseev (2006, 21), immigration security dilemmas
emerge largely because of ‘a shadow of uncertainty about the intentions of
immigrants’, which is amplified by four factors: anarchy, the indistinguishability
between offence and defence, the groupness of immigrants and socio-economic
relations. Receiving populations with socio-economic problems may be threa-
tened by immigrant populations with high in-group solidarity, whose intentions
are uncertain under the condition of anarchy. These factors, for him, construct
immigration phobia, which creates an immigration security dilemma. Although
Alekseev’s empirical analysis provides substantial input for the immigration
security dilemma theory, his security dilemma is an example of the security
paradox. The immigration security dilemma below analyses the choices that are
available to actors, underlined by different logics of insecurity. This framework
brings the concept of trust into the identity–security nexus in the area of
migration.
46 Ali Bilgic
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:0
9 0
9 J
un
e 2
01
5 
Immigrant groups can become a source of insecurity for receiving societies for
myriads of reasons. In order to understand these reasons, analysts can adopt the
‘national identity approach’ in migration studies. The national identity
approach claims that ‘the unique history of each country, its conception of
citizenship and nationality, as well as debates over national identity and social
conflicts within it, shapes immigration policies’ (Meyers 2000, 1251). The
national identity approach focuses on ‘traditions’ that have appeared historic-
ally within a country in the course of political, social and economic interactions
(Herbert 1990, 3).
The national identity approach not only helps analysts to explore why
particular immigrant groups are considered as ‘threats’ by unfolding the
historical, sociological and political characteristics of the receiving society, but
also confirms the McSweeneyian perspective adopted in this discussion. The
political contestation about national identity interacts with ideas and policies
about how to solve the insecurity in relation to particular immigrant groups.
The political actors are in an immigration security dilemma in relation to these
groups, and how they want to address the insecurity problem constitutes a
particular national identity. They are faced with two types of choice.
The first type of choice is underlined by the logic of fatalism. These choices
aim to increase the security of the receiving society without sufficient consid-
eration of how these security policies negatively affect the immigrant groups’
security interests. Political actors which adopt ethnocentric security policies have
a certain conception of a threatened ‘we’ versus a threatening ‘they’. The self-
interests of the receiving society are pursued at the expense of immigrant
groups’ interests, as ‘they’ are not trustworthy. Political actors assume the worst
about the immigrant groups and produce policies to minimise the risk through
exclusion and alienation.
While some fatalism-driven policies aim to stop immigration completely—for
example, the ‘zero immigration policy’ of France—others attempt to deter more
immigrants from coming to a country. Deterrence policies can be the restriction of
welfare benefits for immigrant groups, such as those policies in the UK (Schuster
and Solomos 1999). They can also cover restrictive visa regulations, which, for
example, in the case of some European states, make asylum-seeking and family
unification only ways of immigration (Boswell 2003). Another dimension of these
policies concerns irregular migration. As some immigrants attempt to use asylum-
seeking to migrate and settle, fatalist policies target restrictions in the asylum
system, which negatively affects asylum-seekers (Guild 2006).
Fatalism-driven policies can vary. Their common objective is to make the
receiving society more secure by excluding and marginalising those immigrant
groups in relation to which insecurity is perceived. The point here is not that the
political actors with the fatalist logic want to cause harm to immigrants
intentionally. However, their way of seeking self-security produces negative
implications for the target groups. As the legal migration channels are restricted,
some immigrants attempt to use the services of human-smuggling networks
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(Bruggeman 2002). The restriction of welfare benefits and exclusion of some
groups from economic interaction in a society (such as the voucher system in the
UK for asylum-seekers) pushes immigrants more into the fringes of the wider
community. Therefore, fatalism-driven policies feed into the very insecurity they
purport to target: an attempt to generate self-security results in more insecurity
for all—a security paradox. As a result, the ‘threatened self’–‘threatening other’
dichotomy is (re)constructed.
The second type of choice that political actors have is to build trust towards
immigrant groups and seek the security of the receiving society through
addressing the security needs of the relevant immigrant group. Political actors
with this transcender logic adopt the immigrant group’s interests as their own,
with the expectation that the group will not harm the receiving society’s
interests. They adopt the idea that ‘trust is in my interest’. For example,
transcender-driven policies create new legal channels of migration to cut down
on irregular migration. Considering the irregular migration in the European
Union, the European Commission suggested the formulation of regularisation
mechanisms for irregular immigrants who came to European Union countries
seeking protection for humanitarian reasons (Commission of the European
Communities 2003). Instead of building detention centres where asylum-seekers
are kept, ‘cities of sanctuary’ are created. In these cities, asylum-seekers and
refugees are given a chance to contribute to the receiving society.3 Political
actors formulate mechanisms through which immigrants are informed about the
receiving society. These mentors, who are ordinary members of the receiving
society, interact with the immigrants. This interaction is voluntary and based on
trust. The Time Together program in the UK is an example of such a
mechanism.4
The consequences of the aforementioned actors’ efforts in trust-learning are
yet to be seen. If the trust relationship is successful, their interaction will lead to
the transformation of the receiving society’s properties, or its interests and
identity. Political actors at the state and European Union levels will be enabled
to conceive that the security interests of their society do not necessarily require
the exclusion or marginalisation of immigrant groups. They will believe that the
security of the receiving society does not have to result in the insecurity of
immigrant groups. Political actors may be able to think that ‘trust is my interest’
and the immigration security dilemma may be eventually transcended.
Conclusion
The concept of trust was first introduced in security dilemma theorising by
Booth and Wheeler (2008). This article has taken Booth and Wheeler’s work as
a starting point and aimed to elaborate their conceptual discussion about how
trust contributes to the construction of common identities by presenting a
stronger theoretical foundation. While accepting interest as the focal point of
trust in world politics, it has been argued that trust can be a way to generate
48 Ali Bilgic
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
7:0
9 0
9 J
un
e 2
01
5 
security by constructing a common identity when actors feel insecurity towards
others under the condition of uncertainty, or, to put it simply, when they are in
a security dilemma. This argument has been built on the assumption that a trust
relationship has a transformative effect on actors’ interests and identities. This
transformative role has been explained through a new theoretical foundation.
Strengthened by this theoretical foundation, a new security dilemma has been
illustrated in relation to migration as a contemporary matter of security.
Two main conclusions about trust can be derived from the discussion: trust as
an analytical concept and trust as a political idea. Trust as an analytical concept
has been undertheorised in IR. The current dominant accounts are rather limited
in understanding the role of trust. The alternative approach of Booth and
Wheeler represents a new understanding, although it needs theoretical elabora-
tion with regard to the implications of trust-building for the identity–security
nexus. This study has shown that this theoretical foundation can be constructed
by a combination of Wendtian social constructivism and McSweeney’s sociolo-
gical approach to identity. Trust as a political idea highlights that trust becomes
possible only if political actors realise the potential of the idea to generate self-
security with other social groups, not in opposition to others. As trust-building
is related to how collective identity can be constructed, there is political
contestation about it as well. As briefly highlighted above with regard to the
immigration security dilemma, fatalist and transcender choices coexist in
political structures. Which one prevails is a matter of politics.
Notes
1. The author wishes to thank Ken Booth, Alistair Shepherd, Nick Wheeler and the David Davies
Memorial Institute’s Trust in World Politics multidisciplinary discussion group for their
comments and criticism.
2. This definition is not exclusive, although it is generally accepted by students of IR. One
approach, which was proposed by Robert Jervis (1976), claims that the intentions of actors
(whether they are offensive or defensive) are important in security dilemmas. Based on this
distinction, he proposed the spiral model (actors with defensive intentions) and the deterrence
model (where at least one actor has offensive intentions) (Jervis 1976, 58–113). Following
Jervis, Roe (2005, 73), for example, has formulated three types of societal security dilemma. In
two of them (tight and regular), actors have defensive intentions; in one of them (loose), actors
have aggressive intentions. The conceptualisation of the security dilemma based on differing
intentions, however, is not without a challenge. First, Mitzen (2006) argues that actors
sometimes define themselves in terms of the security dilemma they are in, so whether they have
offensive or defensive intentions does not essentially matter, because the security dilemma is
about their ‘ontological security’. Second, Tang (2010) problematises the intentions-based
approach by arguing that a ‘security dilemma’ between actors with offensive intentions is not a
security dilemma at all. Following Butterfield (1951, 19–21), he argues that, in security
dilemmas, actors must have defensive intentions.
3. See the City of Sanctuary website at http://www.cityofsanctuary.org/resources/criteria.
4. See the Time Together website at http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/time-together-mentor-
ing-for-daily-life/.
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